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ULTRA VIRES TRANSACTIONS
(Concluded).

IV.

Suppose that corporation C is organized to manufacture
ploughs, and that its law contains no express provisions against
following other lines of business; or suppose that C is incorporated for the same purpose, under a different law, which expressly
enjoins it from engaging in other enterprises. In either case if
C were to follow another line of activity and to make a contract
in furtherance of the same it would be ultra vires. On principle, any act which is not expressly authorized, or reasonably
essential to carrying out corporate purposes is improper and beyond charter powers. In order to keep a corporation within its
appropriate sphere of activity it is not necessary to hem it around
with express statements of what it shall not do. Anything outside of the sphere and not pertaining to its business is regarded
as forbidden." This being the situation, it follows that in the
second assumed case the explicit injunction contained in C's law
is surplusage and may well be due merely to an over-anxiety on
the part of the law-making body. C's conduct would have been
just as effectively fettered without the statement. In the normal
case, therefore, it is not safe to say that there is a basis for distinguishing between acts which are beyond corporate power by
reason of an express prohibition and those which are impliedly
forbidden. Each act, so far as being ultra vires, is equally obnoxious. There is no such thing as varying degrees of ultra
vires. A corporate act is either intravires, or not, depending upon
whether it aids in the accomplishment of genuine corporate ends.
So far, then, as the question of ultra vires is concerned, if a
41. The proposition is elementary. See Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, secs. 46 and 68. See supra note 2.
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court is inclined to enforce a contract of this type in spite of an
implied prohibition, it ought to enforce, in the same way and to
the same extent, a contract which is ultra vires because of an
express prohibition.1 a Both agreements are ultra vires in the
same degree, and if one is enforceable, so ought the other to be
unless some other objectionable element is present. Any unauthorized contract, of course, may be contrary to good business
morals, or against public policy, and whenever this is so it will
not be recognized.' Perhaps when an express legislative prohibition is found against the making of a contract, a court may
feel that such statement evidences a strong policy against the
agreement, and signifies a desire, on the part of the legislature,
that it should not be enforced under any conditions or to any
extent. Such decisions are met with in the reports,' and when relief is denied on this ground they are understandable. On the
other hand, if the court refuses to sanction the contract on the
ground that it is of a different ultra 'ires nature, because expressly
forbidden, the decision is not satisfactory and makes an illogical
41a. Naturally whenever a court refuses to enforce an impliedly forbidden
contract, it will refuse to enforce an expressly forbidden one. See,
42.

43.

supra, note 24 and text in connection therewith.
See supra note 18a.

See State Bank v. Oliver (1895) 62 Mo. App. 390 a case not squarely
in point, but illustrating an application of the general principle. In
Boley v. Sonora Co. (1907) 126 Mo. App. 116, 103 S. W. 975 an
agreement by a corporation to purchase its own shares was held to
contravene statutory provisions and accordingly was unenforceable, although executed by the plaintiff. See also Franklin etc. Bank v.
Whitehead (1898) 149 Ind. 560, 49 N. E. 592; Rd Mutual etc. Co.
(1899) 107 Iowa 143, 77 N. W. 868; Morris etc. R. R. v. Sussex R. R.
(1869) 20 N. J. Eq. 542. See also State v. Bank (1907) 136 Iowa 79,
113 N. W. 500; Strickland v. National etc. Co. (1911) 79 N. J.Eq.
182, 81 Atl. 828.
In Wilson v. Mercantile Co. (1912) 167 Mo. App. 305, 149 S. W.
1156 defendant corporation sold its shares, agreeing to repurchase the
same at any time. Plaintiff sought enforcement of the agreement, but
the court held that the statute forbade its making and refused relief
thereon. The court also intimated (wrongly it would seem) that the
agreement was executory, but the real ground for the decision is
stated at p. 325, where it was said: "But when the transaction is one
not permitted, or which is forbidden by law, and not merely in excess of but contrary to the charter powers of the company, the plea
of ultra vires is available." But there should be a recovery in unjust
enrichment. See supra note 26.
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distinction. Still there is a considerable amount of dicta that expressly forbidden ultra vires contracts will not be recognized
merely because they are forbidden."
Some courts are apt to discern in an express legislative provision an intention to penalize the parties by leaving them in

whatever position they may have gotten themselves and neither
one is aided. Yet, other rulings may be found which are exceedingly favorable to a corporation. Some authority holds that the
intention of the legislature in establishing the prohibition was
only to give the state a right to proceed to oust a corporation
from its charter." Other cases are to the effect that the prohibition was only intended to protect a corporation, or some other
interested party, from liability or loss, in the event it exceeds its
authority and binds itself in the forbidden way."
It is not possible to reconcile all of the cases on this point,
but it is suggested that the matter should be approached with the
end in view of determining in each case whether the express
prohibition does embody an emphatic policy against the enforcement of an agreement. The mere presence of an express prohibition is not believed to be a sufficient basis for assuming this
fact. It may be in the law accidentally or as an attempt to incorporate into the statute ordinary common law principles. If,
as a matter of fact, there is no decided policy against the contract, then, it is submitted, that it should be enforced, if the conditions are such as would warrant a court in giving relief on a
similar impliedly forbidden agreement. After all, there is no
substantial difference between the position of the plaintiff in
this case, and the plaintiff under a contract that is ultra vires
44.

See cases cited and quoted from, supra, note 20, and note L. R. A.
1917 A, 1. c. 794.

45.

Union etc. Bank v. Matthews (1878) 98 U. S. 621, 25 L. Ed. 188;
Union etc. Bank v. Rocky Mountain etc. Bank (1877) 96 U. S. 640,

24 L. Ed. 648. See also First National Bank v. Stewart (1882) 107
U. S. 676, 27 L. Ed. 592.

46.

See Union etc. Co. v. Rocky Mountain etc. Bank, supra, note 45;
Union etc. Bank v. Matthews (1878) 98 U. S. 1. c. 629, 25 L. Ed. 188;
Farmington etc. Bank v. Fall (1880) 71 Me. 49; Wald v. Wheelon
(1914)
(1912)

27 N. D. 624, 147 N. W. 402.
246 Mo. 121, 151 S. W. 741.

See also Hunter v. Garanflo

LAW SERIES

26, MISSOURI BuLLETIN

because of an implied prohibition. If a plaintiff is a human
being, he has changed his position, expecting a corporation to
perform, and if a corporation is suing, the innocent shareholders
and creditors may suffer if relief is denied. It would seem improper to hold that just because the law explicitly provides that
the contract shall not be made, innocent parties should be made
to suffer unless the contract is wrong per se or involves the
violation of some important policy which ought to be subserved
under all conditions.
V.
Wherever a statutory or constitutional provision is found,
stating in effect that no corporation shall engage in any business
other than that expressly authorized in its charter, or the law
under which it may have been organized," and a contract in violation of such restriction is made and performed by a plaintiff,
it becomes necessary to determine the exact meaning of the prohibition and how it affects the rights and liabilities of parties to
the transaction. It could be said that its purpose was to make
any contract contrary to the command void and of no effect, and,
under such interpretation, neither party could enforce it even
after complete performance on his or its part. There are cases
so holding.' But the provision might be deemed to only incorporate into the charter "the applicable common law,"" which attributed meaning, in most American jurisdictions on principles
of estoppel hereinbefore discussed,' would lead to a recovery on
a contract by either party after performance on his or its side,
The text appropriates, in substance, the words of the Missouri Constitution. See supra note 17.
48. Anglo-American etc. Co. v. Lombard (1904) 132 Fed. 721 (a case
interpreting the Missouri constitutional prohibition in this way; but

47.

see, infra, note 51) ; Knowles v. Sandercock (1893) 107 Cal. 629, 40
Pac. 1047; Zitrn v. Mitchell (1917)
196 S. W. (Tex.) 544 (see

Texas case contra, cited, infra, note 51). The plaintiff should be able
to sue in unjust enrichment. See supra note 26.
49. Joseph Schlitz etc. Co. v. Missouri etc. Co. (1921) 229 S. W. (Mo.)
1. c. 815.
50. See supra notes 20, 32 and 39 and text in connection therewith.
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5
just as if the bargain had been intra vires.
Decisions agreeing
with the last suggestion are believed to be the better. As has
been urged, it is not wise to lay too much stress on the technical
illegality of the transaction to the detriment and loss of innocent
parties. Of course, if the contract is also wrong per se or is
against some policy, relief should be denied in this case as in
all others where such facts exist."

VI.
The question still remains, assuming that a court recognizes
the principle of equitable estoppel as being properly applicable to
ultra vires contracts, how far must a plaintiff have performed
such an agreement in order to hold a defendant for a breach
thereof ?' Suppose that there has been no actual performance
at all, but that a plaintiff has gone to substantial expense in preparing to perform, and, at that point, a defendant repudiates his
or its obligation. Should damages resulting from the breach be
recoverable? A correct solution of this problem will depend upon the theory which underlies the rule estopping a defendant
51. The Missouri constitutional prohibition appears to have been passed
unnoticed in this connection by the Supreme Court of Missouri until
1921, when it was held in Joseph Schlitz etc. Co. v. Missouri etc. Co.
229 S. W. 813 that it did not make a contract entered into in violation of its terms, a nullity, but that the same would be enforced according to the principles of the common law. In other words, the constitutional provision was held merely declaratory of the general rule
that such a contract, as that described, was ultra vires, but the matter
of enforcing it, if made and performed by the plaintiff, remained as
before. See also accord with this general proposition Summet v.
Realty Co.. (1907) 208 Mo. 501, 106 S. W. 614; Bond v. Terrell etc.
Co. (1891) 82 Tex. 309, 18 S. W. 691.
In Orpheum etc. Co. v. Seavey and Ellett-Kendall Shoe Co.,
supra, note 20, the Kansas City Court of Appeals intimated that a
contract ultra vires a corporation would not be enforceable because
of the constitutional restriction. But these decisions on this point are
contra to the Joseph Schlitz Co. case, supra, and should not be followed.
52. See Hunter v. Garanflo (1912) 246 Mo. 131, 151 S. W. 741, a case
distinguishable only on this ground from Joseph Schlitz etc. Co. v.
Missouri etc. Co., supra, note 51.
52a. If such principle (i. e. that of estoppel) is not recognized by a court
the plaintiff could not recover under any conditions. See supra note 25.
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from questioning the validity of the transaction. If estoppel is
predicated on the fact that a defendant has received the fruits
of the bargain, and will not be allowed to keep them without paying as agreed upon, a plaintiff cannot recover. There has been
no enrichment of the defendant in the assumed case to any extent. There are cases holding that nothing short of performance of the agreement by a plaintiff, to some extent at least, will
entitle him or it to sue for a breach thereof.' Such authority can
be sustained only on the ground that the defendant has not been
benefited by what has been done. It is believed, however, that
it would be better to hold a defendant liable, regardless of whether
there has been any benefit bestowed, if it is found that a repudiation of the contractual obligation will damage a plaintiff.
The reason why a defendant should be estopped from asserting that a contract is ultra vires is not necessarily the fact
that enrichment of a defendant has resulted. Naturally a defendant's enrichment strengthens materially a plaintiff's position,
but this element should not be a controlling one. The determining factor should be a change in position -by a plaintiff to his or
its detriment while relying on a defendant's assumption of an
apparent obligation. By way of illustration in a different but
analogous field, assume that A promises, without consideration,
to convey at a future date a parcel of real estate by way of
gift to B. If B in reliance upon the promise (which is not enforceable in its inception) enters upon the land and changes
his position materially, many courts would hold that the promise to make a gift, because of the injury otherwise resulting to B,
is specifically enforceable, and would compel A to make a conveyance to B." In this case obviously there is no benefit to A.
53.

54.

In Thomas v. West Jersey etc. Co. (1879) 101 U. S. 71, 25 L. Ed. 950
the court said (p. 86): "Having entered into the agreement it was
the duty of the company to rescind or abandon it at the earliest
moment. . . . Though they delayed its performance for several
years, it was nevertheless a rightful act when done. Can this performance of a legal duty . . . give to plaintiff a right of action?"
See also Oregon etc. Co. v. Oregonian etc. Co. (1884) 130 U. S. 1,
32 L. Ed. 837. See cases cited infra note 59, and Nassau Bank v.
Jones (1884) 95 N. Y. 115.
See West v. Bundy, Dozier v. Matsots and Seavey v. Drake, stpr^,
note 39.
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He is not held to his promise because it would be unconscionable
for him to keep something of value without paying for it. He is
bound because of the real hardship which will result to B if A
is allowed to escape. It is not a case of benefit to a defendant,
that moves the court to estop the defendant. It is the hardship
which will otherwise be inflicted on a plaintiff. Accordingly, it
is urged that there is ample authority and justification for holding a defendant to an ultra vires contract, when a plaintiff has
materially changed his or its position relying on the agreement.
A defendant should be bound regardless of whether he or it has
been benefited by what a plaintiff has done. While this is believed
to be the proper way to deal with this situation, there is very
little authority to be found to sustain the writer's contention. The
courts, for the most part, have insisted upon finding that a plaintiff has fulfilled some portion of the agreement before invoking
an estoppel in aid."
If a plaintiff has done more than prepare to perform an
agreement and has actually performed to some extent, but less
than fully, all courts, even though they may never have adopted
the doctrine of estopping a defendant, would permit a plaintiff
to recover to the extent that a defendant has been unjustly enriched. Compelling a defendant to pay this amount is consistent
55. But see Dictum in Harrisv. Independence Gas Co., supra, note 13. In
Mutual etc. Co. v. Stephens (1915) 214 N. Y. 488, 108 N. E. 856
plaintiff was a tenant under an ultra vires lease. The lease contained
an option in favor of plaintiff to purchase the demised premises. The
plaintiff sought specific performance of the option. The court
conceded that this part of the transaction was executory, but
granted the relief prayed for on the ground that plaintiff had gone
so far with performance and execution that it would be unjust to
deny it complete performance. At page 493 the court said: "But it
(i. e. the contract) has been so far executed that it is impossible to
restore the parties to their original situation. . .
have recognized the plaintiff as their tenant. .

. The defendants
. They should

.

not now be permitted to plead its ultra vires act to avoid performing
their part of the agreement. ......
" Even in jurisdictions which
do not estop a corporation to deny its lack of capacity to make an
unauthorized contract, it would be possible, if the corporation were
suing, to estop the defendant from asserting that the agreement was
illegal, if the corporation had changed its position relying on defendant's promise. See supra note 39 and text in connection therewith.
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with the strict orthodox rule as it prevails in the most conservative jurisdictions, because it is said that in such an action a plaintiff is not affirming but disaffirming a transaction." Moreover,
if a court were willing to permit a recovery on a contract, on
the basis of estopping a defendant, it would be possible to do
this in the assumed case, to the extent of performance actually
furnished the defendant, if the contract is divisible, but not if
it is entire" In the latter case, merely the value of that which
has been furnished as distinguished from the contract price could
be allowed.'
When it comes to the matter of that portion of a contract

which has not been fulfilled, and a possible recovery of damages
resulting from a defendant's repudiation on principles of estopping
the latter, the question is much like that where a plaintiff has
merely made preparation for performance. As a rule there has
been no benefit received with respect to this portion of the bargain
by a defendant and that being the case, courts are apt to hold
that there can be no recovery.' As already stated in another connection such a decision seems unjust.' It has also been said by
56. See supra note 26a.
57. Oil Creek etc. Co. v. Penn. Trans. Co. (1876) 83 Pa. St. 160. See
also Sabine Tram Co. v. Bancroft (1897) 40 S. W. (Tex.) 837.
58. See supra note 26. Such a decision would not of necessity involve an
estoppel, but could in accord with the strictest rule proceed on the
theory that the action was in disaffirmance of the contract. But it
might also be predicated on an estoppel. See Day v. Spiral Buggy Co.
(1885)

57 Mich. 146 and, supra, note 57.

In this situation, also, if the corporation is suing to recover the
value of that which it has delivered in part performance of the ultra
vires contract, a court could estop the defendant even though it would
not estop the corporation, were it being sued. See supra note 39 and
text in connection therewith.
59. In Bowman etc. Co. v. Mooney (1891) 41 Mo. App. 665 the contract had been partially executed on each side and the court refused
relief as to the executory portion thereof. Sabine etc. Co. v. Bancroft, supra, note 57; McNulta v. Corn Belt Bank (1897) 164 Ill.
427, 45 N. E. 945, accord. In Day v. Spiral Buggy Co., supra, note
58, 57 Mich. I. c. 152, the court said: "No doubt it results in a degree of hardship in some cases, when a party fails to obtain all that
has been bargained for, but the loss of the anticipated advantages as
as an incident to unauthorized dealings is one for which the parties
themselves are responsible, not the law."
60. See, supra, note 54 and text in connection therewith.
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the courts in cases of this class that that portion of an agreement,
which is unexecuted by a plaintiff, is entirely executory, and the
normal rule in such situations has therefore been applied, and relief denied. A plaintiff is denied a right to sue on a purely executory agreement because nothing has been done in reliance on a
contract." This is not so in the case under discussion, for a
plaintiff has changed his or its position. For this reason the
case in hand is not analogous to the case of a mere executory
contract, and the reasons for denying relief there ought not to
control here. The just ruling would be to entertain an action by
estopping a defendant from asserting its illegality.'
61.

See supra note 13.

62.

In Letup etc. Club v. Hackman (1913)

172 Mo. App. 549, 156 S. W.

791 and in Same v. Cottle (1913) id. 574, 156 S. W. 799 the question
to be decided was whether or not a corporate tenant in possession
under the lease, who had paid the rent, and occupied the premises
during most of the term was entitled to exercise an option to renew
the lease, it being ultra vires? The court held in each case that
the corporation was entitled to specific performance of the option.
It was said (172 Mo. App. 1. c. 568): "Having executed the lease,
and for a period of approximately ten years acquiesced in the exercise by plaintiff of its rights thereunder, and having received the
full consideration stipulated to be paid under the contract it does
not lie in the mouth of the defendants to now question the corporate
capacity of plaintiff when the latter is seeking to specifically enforce
one of the covenants therein, which defendants bound themselves to
perform." At another point in the opinion (p. 567) the court treats
the agreement as being fully executed on the plaintiff's side, so that
perhaps the case merely stands for the proposition that where the
plaintiff has performed fully the defendant is estopped. But such
a rule does not fit the facts and is not applicable. An option contract
gives the optionee the privilege (for which he has paid) of accepting
an offer on furnishing further consideration, i. e. accepting the offer
which is the subject matter of the option. The furnishing of this
further consideration is in its nature executory and is not even an
obligation. Before plaintiff in the principal case would have been
in a position to have alleged that it had fully executed its side of
the agreement it would have had to have assumed the obligations of
a tenant under the new lease. The case therefore is in reality one
where the plaintiff had partially executed its side of the bargain and
changed its position to its detriment. The case, in its result, actually
supports the rule advocated in the text but the reasoning therein

does not. See accord Harris v. Gas Co. (dictum) and Mutual etc.
Co. v. Stephens, supra, note 55.
Vermont etc. Co. v. De Sota etc. Co. (1910) 145 Iowa 491, 122
N. W. 930 is not in point, but suggests arguendo that the material
question in all these classes of cases is the matter of change in plain-
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VII.
Occasionally, a corporation will contract to exercise an apparently legitimate power, but its exercise, under the existing conditions, will be illegal because in furtherance of an unauthorized
purpose. For example, suppose that a corporation contracts to
purchase land, with the secret intention of speculating, which act
is foreign to its business. In such a case all courts would hold
that the corporation's promisee, if he has changed his position
innocently relying on the former's promise, may hold it to the
bargain.' So again, if a corporation, with capacity to issue negotiable notes gives one for an unauthorized purpose, and such
note comes into the hands of a holder in due course, or even of
an innocent assignee, it can be enforced." In each of the assumed cases a corporation would be estopped to deny its capacity
to incur the obligation, because of the obvious injustice, which
would result to an innocent party if an action on the contract
were refused him. In all cases where a corporation appears to
have the power to legally contract in the way in which it does, it
will not be allowed, as against an innocent party, to assert that a
promise was illegal because furthering an unknown ultra vires
object.
There is no certain or reasonable way by which an innocent
party to such an agreement can discover that it is in reality ultra

63.

64.

tiff's position. But see Wilson v. Mercantile Co. (1912) 167 Mo.
App. 305, 149 S. W. 1156, discussed in note 43 supra. It should be
again noted that a court which will not estop a corporation might
still estop the other party to the agreement, at the instance of the
corporation. See supra, note 39 and text in connection therewith.
Re David Payne & Co. (1904) 2 Ch. 608; Miners' etc. Co. v. Zellerbach (1869) 37 Cal. 543 (dictum) ; Bradley v. Bullard (1870) 55 Ill.
622, 55 N. E. 49; N.
413; Brewer etc. Co. v. Boddie (1899) 181 Ill.
Y. etc. Co. v. Kidder etc. Co. (1905) 192 Mass. 391, 78 N. E. 463.
Monument Nat. Bank v. Globe Works (1869) 101 Mass. 57. "But
when the transaction is not the exercise of a power not conferred
on a corporation, but the abuse of a general power in a particular
instance, the abuse not being known to the other contracting party,
the doctrine of ultra vires does not apply." id 58. National Bank v.
Young (1886) 41 N. J. Eq. 531. See also Norton, Bills & Notes, 4th
ed. 288 et seq.
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vires and perhaps for this reason an estoppel may be said to be
legal rather than equitable in its nature. The fact of abuse of
power is peculiarly within the knowledge of the corporation concerned and is acted upon by a plaintiff to his detriment. ' The
ultra vires defect in the transaction is not due to ignorance of
the law. The corporation's promisee could perfectly well know
the law, yet with this knowledge the contract would still be illegal, because of the abuse of power, and yet not appear to be so.
On the other hand, it could be said, even here, that courts in
recognizing the contract as binding, put a corporation above the
law and permit the other party to a transaction to successfully
contend that a corporation can exercise a power which it did not
possess. It seems certain that the action of the corporation is
really ultra ires. Every power, regardless of the fact that it
may be legally possessed in certain connections, is illegally exercised when it is used to accomplish a non-corporate purpose."a
However, in spite of these technical and theoretical objections,
for the sake of a plaintiff, it would not do to sustain a plea of
ultra vires to an action on such a contract.
In cases where an abuse of power is known to a party who
contracts with a corporation at the time of the making thereof,
the corporation should not be held liable in any jurisdiction except to the extent that there may have been unjust enrichment."
65.

It is not believed, absent some detriment to the plaintiff through
change in position or performance, that the estoppel should be invoked. But see contra Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, sec.
1061. The cases cited by the learned author to support his suggestion do not seem convincing.
65a. But see cases of corporate loans cited and discussed, infra, note 66
which seem to regard such transactions as being really intra vires.
66. The cases for the most part assume this but see National Bank v.
Globe Works, supra, note 64; National Bank v. German-American
etc. Co. (1889) 116 N. Y. 281, 22 N. E. 567. It has been held where
money is loaned to a corporation to further an ultra vires purpose
that the lender can sue and recover the same on the contract even
though he knew of the ulterior improper purpose. Jenson v. Teltec
etc. Co. (1909) 174 Fed. 86. See also cases accord collected in note
L. R. A. 1917 A. 1. c. 763. The only basis for such a decision, unless
placed on the broadest kind of an equitable estoppel is that the act
of borrowing is intra vires because the corporation possesses a general and unlimited capacity to borrow. In Wright v. Hughes (1889)
119 Ind. 1. c. 330, 21 N. E. 907, the Supreme Court of Indiana in
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No estoppel ought to be invoked to help a plaintiff who has attempted to acquire a right with his eyes open in deliberate violation of the law.' If relief were given under such facts, it could
not be based upon an estoppel of the technical variety, because
there has been no action in the dark by a plaintiff to his detriment. There is nothing approaching deception in this situation.
Turning to the rights of a corporation under this kind of a
contract, if it is purely executory, no relief ought to be granted
thereon. There has been no deception and no change of position, and the ordinary rule in such cases should be applied." On
the other hand, if a corporation has executed its side of the agreement, or partially executed it, or changed its position in preparing for execution, recovery ought to be allowed or denied in
accordance with the decisions of the particular jurisdiction as
hereinbefore discussed.' The case is merely that which is ordinarily encountered, i. e. an ultra vires contract sued upon by a
corporation.

67.
68.
69.

dealing with such a transaction said: "The power to borrow money
was plenary and subject to no restrictions. In such a case although
the lender may know that it is the purpose of the borrower to use
the money in an irregular way, yet if the contract between the
lender and the borrower is not in violation of law or declared void
by statute, the money may be recovered unless the lender was in
some way implicated in furthering the borrower's design or accessory to the prohibited or illegal act." But there were other compelling reasons for the ruling. See also Thompson v. Lambert (1876)
44 Iowa 239.
It is submitted that a corporation never has plenary power to do
any act. It is only when the act is done in pursuance of authorized
corporate objects that it is intra vires. Whenever it is done for any
other purpose it becomes illegal. No corporate act can be taken from
its setting and, after an examination in the abstract, characterized
as either legal or illegal. If the act reasonably appears to an outsider to be legal and this appearance is acted on to the latter's detriment, then there should be an estoppel but not otherwise. Of course,
the results of the cases which allow a lender to recover are probably correct. Unless the transaction is wrong per se the lender
should recover the amount which the corporation has been enriched
in an action sounding in quasi contract. See supra note 26. See contrary to the Hughes case, supra, Maryland etc. Co. v. Bank (1906)
102 Md. 608, 63 Atl. 70.
See supra note 30.
See supra note 13.
See especially notes 31 and 39, supra, and text in connection with each.
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VIII.
A corporation will sometimes enter into an agreement of

which only a portion will be ultra vires. Under such conditions,
when for any reason a plea of ultra vires will be available to either
party, it is essential to determine whether it will go to entirely
defeat an action on the contract or merely to prevent relief on
that portion which is objectionable in this respect. If the contract is entire and indivisible, the plea if available will defeat the
action altogether." On the other hand, however, even though the
plea is available, if the contract is divisible and the defendant,
according to ordinary rules of contract law, cannot object to a
suit on the legal part, the actions should lie to this extent.'1 In any
event it would be proper, if the defendant has been unjustly enriched to allow a recovery for that value in an ordinary quasicontractual action."
Ix.
A matter remaining for consideration is the effect of complete execution of an ultra vires contract by each of the parties
thereto. We are not concerned with enforcing the agreement. It
has been fully executed. The problem is, what rights may be
founded on such performance? Has each party complete legal
title to the benefits received, or has the corporation, as a matter
of fact, because of a legally inherent inability and lack of power,
neither parted with nor received anything as a result of attempting to carry out the bargain? If the corporation has passed and
See Downing v. Mount Washington etc. Co. (1860) 49 N. H. 149;
Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, sec. 1059.
71. Farmers' etc. Bank v. Harrison (1874) 57 Mo. 503; National Bank v.
70.

Kiefer etc. Co. (1893) 95 Ky. 97, 23 S. W. 675; Machen, op. cit. sec.

1059; Thomson, Corporations, sec. 5981. See also Kraniger v.
People's etc. Soc. (1895) 60 Minn. 94, 61 N. W. 904, and Downing v.
Mount Washington etc. Co., supra, note 70. Sed qu. Might not the
whole transaction be regarded as tainted with illegality? See Shaw
v. Carpenter (1881) 54 Vt. 155.
72. See Farmers' etc. Bank v. Harrison and Kraniger v. People's etc.
Soc., supra, note 71.
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received title, as intended, following performance, is the closed
transaction to be regarded by the courts as unassailable by the
parties thereto, or may it be avoided by either or both of them?
Of course, the transaction will always be open to attack by the
state if the public interest has been affected to the extent of making the corporation liable in quo warranto proceedings to an
ouster.'
Carrying the doctrine that a corporation is a being of fixed
powers and capacities to its natural conclusion, courts, wherever
such a conception prevails, should hold that so far as fulfillment
of an agreement involved corporate action nothing resulted therefrom."4 Under such a theory if corporation C ultra vires bargained to convey land to V, and pursuant to such an arrangement
C purported to grant to V and received the purchase money stipulated for, it would seem to follow that C still owned the land and
did not have title to the money. Logically, therefore, C ought
to be able to bring an action to recover possession of the land
and remove the cloud on the title, which the purported deed cast
on it. V should likewise have a right to recover the money. The
conveyance and the receipt of the money were not corporate acts,
but would have to be considered as the acts of those who wrongfully and without authority attempted to act for C. No corporate
significance should be attributed to the transaction whatever."
Undoubtedly, if a corporation's law or charter provided that its
73. See supra notes 6, 7 and 8.
74. See supra note 2.

75. Professor E. H. Warren aptly expresses this idea in speaking of a
lease executed ultra vires by a corporation. He says (Warren's
Cases on Corporations 1.c. 756 note): "If the objection to the ultra
vires lease was, as stated in the Central Transportation case (see
supra note 2) 'not merely that the corporation ought not to have made
it, but that it could not make it,' it would seem to follow that the act
of making the lease was simply the act of certain human beings to
which no corporate significance could be given; that the lease was
a cloud on the plaintiff's title; and that it was entitled to a declaration to that effect, with the relief properly predicated upon such a
declaration." See Barrows v. Niblock (1898) 84 Fed. l11, accord.
But the Supreme Court holds differently.
Courts have sometimes held an ultra vires act to be that of the
human beings who purported to act for and bind the corporation.
See supra note 28.
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ultra vires act should be void, a court might hold that the doing
of such an act in the course of performance of an agreement would
be a nullity." But absent any such express provision, no decision
has been found which goes to this extreme, either in a case where
the act done was expressly or impliedly forbidden.
The Supreme Court of the United States, which, as we have
seen, has been fairly persistent in laying down the rule of limited
corporate capacity," has often been called upon to deal with the
situations now under discussion, and has without any apparent
hesitation invariably held that a transaction, when completed,
would be recognized as vesting the intended rights, and would
not be subject to attack, or open to objection at the instance of
any one except the appropriate government. The court's attitude towards such a problem is well illustrated by Kerfcot v.
Farmers' and Merchants' Bank." That was an action in eject-

ment, with a "count" in equity, to reg~in possession of and title
to land, which had been conveyed by the plaintiffs' predecessor
to a national bank and by it in turn to the defendants. The bank
had no capacity to take title, and the plaintiffs proceeded on the
theory that the title never left their predecessor, and therefore, on
his death, came to them. The Supreme Court, however, refused
to sanction such a contention, holding that the deed to the bank
did convey title and that the bank in turn effectively and legally
passed title to the defendants. In this connection the Supreme
76. See Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, sec. 1066; Hunter v. Garanflo (1912) 246 Mo. 131, 151 S.W. 741; Lee v. Bankers' Trust Co.
(1911) 157 Mo. App. 557, 138 S. W. 669. See also cases cited, supra,
note 18 and Union etc. Bank v. State etc. Bank (1889) 155 Mo. 95,
55 S. W. 989. But see Chase etc. Co. v. National etc. Co. (1914)
215 Fed. 633. There is considerable loose dicta in the cases to the
effect that "void" transactions when executed are to be left undisturbed, but the statements are usually obiter, and the transactions referred to will be found to be ultra vires and "void" because impliedly
forbidden. Some such statements are collected in a note in L. R. A.
1917 A, 1.c. 759.

Such expressions are unfortunate and serve to

make one lose sight of the distinction between the ordinary ultra vires
transaction and one which the organic law characterizes as "void."
If the act be of the latter variety, no rights should ever arise therefrom. The doing of it should bring nothing to pass.
77. See supra note 24.
78. (1910) 218 U. S.281, 54 L. Ed. 1042.
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Court said: "In the absence of a clear expression of legislative
intention to the contrary, a conveyance of real estate to a corporation for a purpose not authorized by its charter is not void,
but voidable, and the sovereign alone can object. Neither the
grantor nor his heirs nor third persons can impugn it on the
ground that the grantee exceeded its powers.""0 This rule was
justified on the ground that it had the "salutary effect of assuring
the security of titles, and of avoiding the injurious consequences,
which would otherwise result."8
The proposition that an executed ultra vires transaction serves
to vest title to the fruits of the bargain in each of the parties
thereto, unless the law expressly provides to the contrary, is well
established in all jurisdictions" and is the only just decision under
79.
80.

81.

218 U. S. 1. c. 286.
218 U. S. 1. c. 287.

See, accord, Land v. Coffman (1872) 50 Mo. 243;
Shewalter v. Pirner (1874) 55 Mo. 218. See also Ragan v. McElroy
1889) 98 Mo. 349, 11 S. W. 735.
Thornton v. Nat. Bank (1879) 71 Mo. 221; First Nat. Bank v. Gillilan (1880) 72 Mo. 77; Franklin etc. Inst. v. Board (1882) 75 Mo.
408; Hovelinan v. Kansas City R. R. (1883) 79 Mo. 632; St. Louis
Drug Co. v. Robinson (1883) 81 Mo. 18; Belcher Sugar Co. v. St.
Louis etc. Co. (1890) 101 Mo. 192, 13 S. W. 822; Conn. etc. Co. v.
Smith (1893) 117 Mo. 261, 22 S. W. 623; Kansas City etc. Ry. v.
Kansas City etc. Ry. (1895) 129 Mo. 62, 31 S. W. 451; White Oaks
etc. Soc. v. Murray (1898) 145 Mo. 622, 47 S. W. 501 (dictum);
Hall v. Bank (1898) 145 Mo. 418, 46 S. W. 1000; Riesterer v. Horton
Land Co. (1900) 160 Mo. 141, 61 S. W. 238; Sunmmett v. City etc.
Co. (1909) 208 Mo. 501, 106 S. W. 614; Ancell v. Ill. etc. Bridge Co.
(1909) 223 Mo. 209, 122 S. W. 709; Union Bank v. Hunt (1879) 7
Mo. App. 42 (dictum) (see same case, reversed on other grounds 76
Mo. 439) ; St. Louis etc. Co. v. Partridge (1880) 8 Mo. App. 217;
City v. Bank (1898) 74 Mo. App. 365; Hough v. St. Louis Car Co.
(19,14) 182 Mo. App. 718; 165 S. W. 1161.
See also cases cited, supra, note 80 accord; Martindale v. Kansas City etc. Co. (1875) 60 Mo. 508; Kinealy v. St. Louis etc. Co.
(1879) 69 Mo. 658; Hill v. Rich Hill etc. Co. (1893) 119 Mo. 9, 24
S. W. 223. The last three cases lay down the rule that ultra vires
transactions are not subject to collateral attack.
See further in accord with the text, National Bank v. Stewart
(1882) 197 U. S. 676; Reynolds v. Nat. Bank (1884) 112 U. S. 405,
28 L. Ed. 733; Long v. Georgia Pac. Ry. (1890) 91 Ala. 519, 8 So.
706; DeWitt etc. Bank v. Mickelberry (1910) 244 Ill. 77, 91 N. E.
86; Baker v. Northwestern etc. Co. (1886) 36 Minn. 185, 30 N. W.
464; Hagerstown etc. Co. v. Keedy (1900) 91 Md. 430, 46 Atl. 965
(dictum). See contra Matthews v. Skinker (1876) 62 Mo. 329, a
case taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, and there
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the conditions. The arguments advanced in favor of recognizing
as valid partially executed ultra vires agreements*: apply with even
greater force to executed transactions. No real good could be accomplished by ripping open the transaction or by treating that
which has been done as a nullity to the detriment of corporate
shareholders and creditors, or the other party to the agreement.
It is better to leave the parties as they are and to allow the state,
if any real injury to the public has followed to watch over this
phase of the matter.
If a corporation acquires a right ultra vires, it is in the position of a legal owner or obligee as against all the world except
the state. It is the same as if it held title intra vires and it cannot be shown collaterally that this is not the case. It can assert
and sustain such a title" and convey or assign it, passing an indefeasible right when so doing." Furthermore, so lohg as a
corporation retains such title, it should be held to all the normal
duties of a legal owner. It should, for instance, be liable for a
tort committed in connection with land owned by it. The courts
overruled sub norn. National Bank v. Matthews 98 U. S. 621, 25 L.
Ed. 188. The Skinker case has not been followed by the Missouri
courts. For a discussion of this case see, infra, note 97 and text in
connection therewith.
82. See, snpra, note 20 and text in connection therewith.
83. Conn. etc. Co. v. Smith (1893) 117 Mo. 261, 22 S. W. 623; Hall v.
Farmer etc. Bank (1898) 145 Mo. 418, 46
etc. Soc. v. Murray (1898) 145 Mo. 622,
Ancell v. So. Ill. etc. Co. (1909) 223 Mo.
Louis etc. Co. v. Partridge (1880) 8 Mo.

S. W. 1000; White Oak
47 S. W. 501 (dictum);
209, 122 S. W. 709; St.
App. 217; Alexander v.

Tollestou Club (1884) 110 Ill. 65; Chicago R. R. Co. v. Keegan
(1900) 185 Ill. 70, 56 N. E. 1088; Lancaster v. Amsterdam etc. Co.
(1894) 140 N. Y. 576. See also Kansas City etc. Ry. v. Kansas City
etc. Ry. (1895)

129 Mo. 62, 31 S. W. 451.

If a corporation acquires a title ultra vires and thereafter leases
the property, the lease will be valid and the covenants therein contained enforceable. See Springer v. Chicago etc. Co. (1903) 202 I1.
17, 66 N. E. 850. See also Cowell v. Springs Co. (1879) 100 U. S.
55, 25 L. Ed. 547.
84. Land v. Coffinan (1872) 50 Mo. 243; Showalter v. Pirner (1874)
55 Mo. 218; Ragan v. McElroy (1889)

98 Mo. 349, 11 S. W. 735;

Hall v. Farmers etc. Bank (1898) 145 Mo. 418, 46 S. W. 1000; Lantry v. Wallace (1900) 182 U. S. 536, 45 L. Ed. 1218 (dictum) ; Leazure v. Hillegas (1821) 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 313. See also Walsh
v. Barton (1873) 24 Ohio St. 28.
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in this respect should place ultra vires ownership on the same footing with legal ownership with all the consequent duties and burdens." Nevertheless in some rare cases, this altogether correct
result has not been reached by some courts.
It has been held that a corporation, which owns shares in another corporation ultra vires will not be subject to the statutory
liability imposed on such an owner." If ownership of shares is to
be considered a status, as is title to any other form of property,
the burden of responding to the statutory duty should rest upon
a corporate shareholder just as if it held the shares intra vires.
As already indicated,"7 courts regard an executed ultra vires transaction as being of the same character as one which is intra vires.
It is as if a corporation had acquired the right legally with all of
the results usually attached to such a title. If a corporation,
without authority, owns Blackacre, it should be subject to all
the duties and burdens, which the law exacts as incidental to such
ownership. Why, then, should it not likewise be the rule, that an
ultra vires corporate shareholder should be subject to similar burdens? There would seem to be no real basis for making a distinction between the two situations, and a corporation should be
liable in the way that the statute provides."
85. See Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, sec. 1072; Alexander v.
Relfe (1881) 74 Mo. 495. There is scant authority on this precise
question but the reasoning adopted in all cases dealing with the matter of ultra vires ownership, leads to the suggested conclusion.
86. California National Bank v. Kennedy (1897) 167 U. S. 362, 42 L.
Ed. 198; Conrad etc. Bank v. Hawkins (1898) 174 U. S. 364, 43
L. Ed. 1007; First etc. Bank v. Converse (1905) 200 U. S. 425, 50
L. Ed. 537. See also Merchants' Bank v. Wehrmann (1906) 202 U.
S. 295, 50 L. Ed. 1036; Converse v. Emerson (1909) 242 Ill. 619, 90
N. E. 269.
87. See supra note 82.
88. " * * * a corporation may be liable for an ultra vires act (National Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699; Salt Lake City v. Hollister,
118 U. S. 256) and * * * a transfer to it of property, ultra vires
for it to hold, usually becomes a foundation to it of the rights commonly incident to the ownership of such property (National Bank v.
Matthews, supra, Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U. S. 55, 60; Reynolds
v. Crawfordsville Bank, 112 U. S. 405, 413.) It is submitted that
such transfer should also be a foundation of the liabilities commonly
incident to the ownership of such property." Note, Warren, Cases
on Corporations, I. c. 698.
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The statutory liability of a shareholder has been described
as being contractual in its nature," and, upon this ground, the
courts have usually proceeded to the decision that a corporation
will not be liable under the statute upon the shares which it holds
illegally. Naturally, if the obligation is of this nature, and the
courts will not recognize the doctrine of estopping a corporation
to deny its capacity, the decisions are logical. But there is no
real contract in such a case. The promise to respond, according
to a statute, is at best a fiction and the ordinary shareholder would
be responsible even though he had never assumed the duty." It
is an obligation which the law compels a shareholder to assume
and such a duty lacks all of the elements of a true contract, except that it can be said in a general way that every man is presumed to intend to do that which the law requires of him. Occasionally, however, a shareholder will not intend to conduct himself in this way, yet he will be held to the duty. It is this last
situation which shows quite clearly that the burden is not contractual but exists in invitum" It has been held that a corporation
shareholder is entitled to dividends declared on its shares, as incidental to title." If a corporation occupies the status for one
purpose, why does it not occupy it for all? It is not suggested
that liability ought to exist for the sake of "symmetry" but because it is felt that duty is incidental to ownership just as much
as benefits are, and because the former does not depend for its
valid existence in any sense upon the assumption of an ultra vires
contractual obligation."a
Whitman v. Oxford etc. Bank (1900) 176 U. S. 559, 44 L. Ed. 587.
Hohfeld, Stockholders' Individual Liability, 9 Col. Law Rev. 285.
The obligation imposed by the statutes * * * is quasi ex contractu. It must be taken that all persons who become stockholders
know the law * * * and assent to the liability which the law
imposes upon stockholders. * * *." Post etc. Co. v. Toledo etc.
Co. (1887) 144 Mass. 1. c. 343, 11 N. E. 540. "Over and over again
therefore the obligation of X (a shareholder) and the other stockholders may come into existence without their actual concurrence,
and in some cases in spite of their express dissent. * * *" Hohfeld, op. cit. 312.
92. See Bigbee etc. Co. v. Moore (1898) 121 Ala. 379, 25 So. 602.
92a. There is authority holding that the corporation shareholder is liable
to respond to the statutory liability. See Hough v. St. Louis Car

89.
90.
91.
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X.
Cases where a corporation is suing upon an ultra vires contract must not be confused with those where, without authority, it
has obtained by assignment or purchase a chose in action or negotiable instrument. The first situation has been dealt with and
it has been seen that some courts denied recognition to such agreements on the ground that they were nullities." Suppose, however,
that P has a good contract right against D, legal in every way
and one upon which P could sue D and recover. P assigns such
right to corporation C, which could not become an assignee intra
vires, it being either expressly or impliedly forbidden. Should D
be able to defect C's action on the promise by pleading ultra vires?
It might be suggested that this defense should be available on ordinary orthodox principles."4 Such a holding, however, is not
sound, and not in accord with the proposition, recognized by all
courts, that where a corporation obtains a title its rights thereunder are not subject to attack on the ground that there was no
authority to acquire such a right." There is no infirmity in the
promise which C, as assignee, sues upon. The obligation was good
in its inception and C's position, is merely that of a corporation
which has gotten a vested right through the exercise of an unauthorized capacity. Courts are not disposed to deny a corporation the benefits accruing to it through the possession and con-

93.
94.

95.

Co. (1914) 182 Mo. App. 718, 165 S. W. 1161; City v. Bank (1898)
74 Mo. App. 365; Fidelity etc. Co. v. German etc. Bank (1905) 127
Iowa 591, 103 N. W. 958. But see Lee v. Bankers Trust Co. (1911)
157 Mo. App. 557, 138 S. W. 669 where the court would not hold
the corporation because its act in acquiring the shares and holding
them was against public policy.
See supra note 24.
See Wilks v. Ga. etc. Co. (1885) 79 Ala. 170, a case where the court
did not recognize the possible difference between a case where the
corporation was the contracting party and one where it was the assignee of such a person.
Suppose that an obligee assigns his contractual right to a corporation. The corporation would take the right with the burden.
If the burden involved the doing of an act ultra vires, the corporation, whenever the doctrine of estoppel is not recognized, should not
recover.
See supra note 81.
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ceded ownership of such a right. The contract sued upon is not
ultra vires. All that was done, which was open to this objection,
has been completed and is a closed chapter. Accordingly, the
better rule will permit a corporation to sue as an assignee and
deny the availability of the defense."
XI.
There are a number of cases in the Supreme Court of the
United States and elsewhere dealing with the rights of a corporation to utilize security, which it has taken ultra vires to assure
payment of an obligation running to it. The national banking act
contained a provision expressly forbidding banks organized thereunder to loan money on real security, but they nevertheless did
so from time to time. The question has been: can a mortgage,
or deed of trust, taken in violation of the express statutory prohibition, be enforced or foreclosed? The federal supreme court
has invariably held that this can be done and that the plea of
ultra vires could not be raised to defeat an appropriate use of the
security. Probably the case most often cited on this point is
National Bank v. Matthews," which went up from the Supreme
Court of Missouri." It was an action to restrain a sale by a
trustee, under a deed of trust, on the ground that the defendant
corporation could not legally take such security. The court, reversing the Missouri Supreme Court, held that an injunction
96.

First Nat. Bank v. Gillilam (1880) 72 Mo. 77; Franklin etc. Inst. v.
Roscoe (1882) 75 Mo. 408; Riesterer v. Horton etc. Co. (1900) 160
Mo. 141, 61 S. W. 238; Prescott etc. Bank v. Butler (1893) 157 Mass.
548, 32 N. E. 909; Hennessy v. St. Paul (1893) 54 Minn. 219'; State

etc. Co. v. Farmers Co. (1902)
etc. Co. v. Wolf (1897)

65 Neb. 34, 90 N. W. 997; Farwell

96 Wis. 10, 70 N.

See also St. Joseph etc. Co. v. Hauck (1880)
97.

(1878)

98 U.

S. 621, 25 L. Ed. 188.

W.

289, 71 N. W.

109.

71 Mo. 465.

The case was one where the

plaintiff bank took the deed of trust by assignment. It was not issued
to it directly but to its assignors, who then borrowed money from the
plaintiff assigning the deed of trust to secure their obligation. The
case, on this ground, might have been assimilated to those discussed,
supra, in connection with note 96. But the court treated the case
as one involving simply the question of a corporation's right under
a deed of trust taken without authority.
98.

Matthews v. Skinker (1876)

62 Mo. 329.
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would not issue. It was admitted that the act of taking the
security was unauthorized and forbidden, but it was held that inasmuch as the deed had been executed and the money loaned on
the faith thereof, the bank's rights would be left undisturbed and
a sale allowed. The exact reasons for the decision are not altogether clear. The court says at one point in its decision that it
could not have been the intent of Congress to nullify the transaction to the detriment of innocent parties interested in the corporation." In another connection it was said that the transaction
was at most only technically illegal and that the bank's "garments"
were "unspotted,"'" but the gist of the court's reasoning seems
to be that it would be unjust to permit the plaintiff to borrow and
use the money and then prevent a foreclosure of the deed of trust
because the corporation was not competent to take it. The court
also said that the bank never got title to the land... (it being in
the trustee under the deed) but this distinction seems to be unduly refined, for a corporation ought not to be able to do through
a trustee that which it cannot do directly. The case has been
followed ever since and has been cited frequently to sustain the
proposition that where a corporation gains a title ultra vires, it is
not assailable, or subject to attack at the instance of any one except the state. '
99.
100.
101.

98 U. S. I. c. 629.
98 U. S. 1. c. 626.
98 U. S. 1. c. 625: "Here the bank never had any title, legal or equi-

table, to the real estate in question."

102.

It is difficult to understand

what the court meant by this statement, especially in view of the
following statement in the same decision: "Where a corporation is
incompetent by its charter to take a title to real estate, a conveyance
to it is not void, but only voidable, and the sovereign alone can object. It is valid until assailed * * *" 98 U. S. 1.c. 628. It is
submitted that the bank did get an equitable title to the land for the
purpose of security, as is always the case in a mortgage transaction.
Even though the bank was not the party for whom the deed was
originally executed, still, as assignee, it became the equitable owner
of the security.
Thornton v. Nat. Bank (1879) 71 Mo. 221; St. Louis Drug Co. v.
Robinson (1883) 81 Mo. 18; Suinmett v. City etc. Co. (1907) 208
Mo. 501, 106 S. W. 614; National Bank v. Whitney (1880) 103 U.
S. 99, 26 L. Ed. 443; Fortier v. New Orleans etc. Bank (1884) 112
U. S. 439, 28 L. Ed. 764. See Union Bank v. Hunt (1879) 7 Mo.
App. 42, same case 76 Mo. 439.
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The possible effect of Bank v. Matthews upon federal decisions is more or less problematical. It may amount merely to a
holding that a mortgage or deed of trust is an executed transaction; that a corporate mortgagee's rights are therefore completely vested; and that for this reason foreclosure is proper and
entirely in accord with the federal or strict rule. Under such a
conception, foreclosure would merely amount to a corporation
asserting a vested right. It would be analogous to a case where
a corporation brings ejectment to recover possession of land
which it owned ultra vires.'"' While it is true that there is authority for holding that a mortgage is an executed transaction,' "
its soundness, especially if the question is raised in an action of
foreclosure, is open to doubt. If the debt fails for any reason it
is always held that the mortgage as incidental thereto fails also."®
It would be more correct to say that the mortgage is executory,
°5
just as the debt is.' a
Foreclosure of mortgages taken by a corporation ultra vires
can also be justified on the ground that a defendant should be
estopped to assert a corporation's inability to enter into the transaction. ' It is believed that such a decision would be just and to
a certain extent reconcilable with the conception that a corporation
is a person of limited capacity, as that doctrine has been developed
by the more conservative courts in actions against corporations.10'a It is to be hoped that the foreclosure cases will lead
the way at least to a general rule in the federal courts to the ef-

103.
104.
105.
105a.
106.
106a.

This is the view which Mr. Machen takes of the decision. Machen,
op. cit. sec. 1036.
Campbell v. Tompkins (1880) 32 N. J. Eq. 170; Raguet v. Roll
(1836) 7 Ohio Rep. 70.
Shaw v. Carpenter (1881) 54 Vt. 155; Stillman v. Looney (1866)
3 Cold. (Tenn.) 20.
Pearce v. Wilson (1885) 111 Pa. St. 14.
See supra, note 40 and text in connection therewith.
See supra, notes 39 and 40 and text in connection therewith.
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fect that a corporation, whenever it has performed its side of
the agreement and represents innocent parties, may sue upon the
contract itself.0 7
JAMES LEWIS PARKS,

University of Missouri School of Law.

107.

The case book on private corporations by Professor E. H. Warren
and that by Professor Burnett have been of assistance to the writer
in the preparation of this article. The arrangement of authorities
in each volume is helpfully suggestive and Professor Warren's notes
often point to a solution of troublesome problems.

